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Nonprice competition
in “substitute” drugs:
The FTC’s blind spot
BY GREGORY DOLIN, M.D.*
As the recent case of United States v. Lundbeck illustrates, the Federal
Trade Commission’s lack of knowledge in medical and pharmacological
sciences affects its evaluation of transactions between medical and
pharmaceutical companies that involve transfers of rights to
manufacture or sell drugs, causing the agency to object to such
transactions without solid basis for doing so. This article argues that
in order to properly define a pharmaceutical market, one must not
just consider the condition that competing drugs are meant to treat,
but also take into account whether there are “off-label” drugs that are
used to treat a relevant condition, whether drugs actually compete
with each other on price or whether they are selected based on their
side-effects (or lack thereof), mechanism of action, physician
knowledge, and other noneconomic considerations, and finally
whether the drugs in question enjoy any patent or nonpatent-based
exclusivity that prevents generic manufacturers from entering the
market.
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exclusivity
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission (the FTC or the Commission) has been
instrumental in enforcing America’s antitrust laws for the last century
across all industries—and with remarkable success. But while the FTC
wields extensive expertise in law and economics, it lacks solid ground-
ing in the medical and pharmacological sciences. This lack of knowl-
edge, however, affects the FTC’s evaluation of proposed transactions
between various medical and pharmaceutical companies that involve
transfers of rights to manufacture or sell drugs, causing the agency to
object to such transactions without solid basis for doing so.
This article will focus on the fundamental errors in the FTC’s
analysis in FTC v. Lundbeck,1 a case in which the Commission
attempted to dissolve the acquisition by one company of rights cover-
ing two drugs that treating the same condition.2 The Lundbeck case is
illustrative because the FTC took the position that the relevant market
is defined by the condition being treated,3 without considering other
medical issues relevant to the drug used to treat that condition. After
an introduction to the case in section II, section III rejects the position
that the drugs competed, explains why the FTC rightfully lost its case
in Lundbeck, and suggests an alternative approach to evaluating rights
transactions in the pharmaceutical market. I will offer concluding
observations in section IV.
II. THE LUNDBECK CASE
In 2005, Lundbeck, then named Ovation Pharmaceuticals, pur-
chased the rights to Indocin IV (Indocin),4 an off-patent drug, from
Merck & Co. Indocin is used to treat a neonatal condition known as
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1 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011).
2 See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief,
Including Disgorgement of Unlawful Monopoly Profits, FTC v. Ovation
Pharm., No. 08-6379, 2010 WL 3810015 (D.Minn. Aug 31, 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/12/081216
ovationcmpt.pdf.
3 See id. at 5.
4 See FTC v. Ovation Pharm., No. 08-6379, 2010 WL 3810015, at * 1 (D.
Minn. Aug. 31, 2010).
patent ductus arteriosus (PDA) in which the duct that shunts blood to
bypass the lungs of a neonate (a physiological necessity prebirth) fails
to close after birth.5 The condition can be treated either medically or
surgically, with the medical method being preferred as its risks are
lower. Interestingly, simple ibuprofen can be used to treat the condi-
tion and cause the duct to close.6
In the meantime, another pharmaceutical company—Abbott Lab-
oratories—developed an alternative treatment for PDA. That drug,
called NeoProfen, was a salt of ibuprofen that could be administered
intravenously.7 Abbott began the final Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval process in late 2005, with approval coming in April
2006.8 While Abbott was in the midst of the FDA process, Lundbeck
approached it with an offer to acquire the rights to the drug.9 In early
2006, Lundbeck acquired the rights to NeoProfen.10 Thus, Lundbeck
“SUB S T I T U T E “ DRUG S : 581
5 See NAT’L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST., WHAT IS PATENT DUCTUS
ARTERIOSUS?, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/pda/
(last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
6 See, e.g., Sh. Pourarian, et al., Comparison of Oral Ibuprofen and
Indomethacin on Closure of Patent Ductus Arteriosus in Preterm Infants, 14 E.
MEDITERRANEAN HEALTH J. 360, 364 (2008) (concluding that “oral preparations
of these drugs may have a similar efficacy to the intravenous preparations for
ductal closure in preterm infants in developing countries where supplies of
intravenous drugs are unavailable,” and are “a safer alternative.”); Eli Hey-
man, et al., Closure of Patent Ductus Arteriosus With Oral Ibuprofen Suspension in
Premature Newborns: A Pilot Study, 112 PEDIATRICS e354, e355 (2003) (reporting
95.5% effectiveness of oral suspension of ibuprofen in closing PDA); Sau
Supapannachart, et al., Oral Ibuprofen and Indomethacin for Treatment of Patent
Ductus Arteriosus in Premature Infants: A Randomized Trial at Ramathibodi Hospi-
tal, 85 J. MED. ASSOC. THAI. S1252, S1258 (2002) (concluding that “[o]ral
ibuprofen therapy is as effective as indomethacin for the treatment of PDA in
premature infants and seems to have fewer renal side effects.”).
7 Ovation, 2010 WL 3810015, at *5.
8 See id.; Food & Drug Admin., Label and Approval History for Neopro-
fen, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm
?fuseaction=Search.Label_ApprovalHistory#apphist (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
9 Ovation, 2010 WL 3810015, at *5-6.
10 Id.
became the owner of both drugs approved by the FDA for the treat-
ment of PDA.
Prior to completing the acquisition of NeoProfen, Lundbeck dras-
tically raised the price on Indocin over the price charged by Indocin’s
previous owner, Merck).11 The price rose from just under $80 to $1,500
for a course of treatment. Once Lundbeck acquired NeoProfen, it
priced it slightly lower than Indocin, but in the same general range.12
The FTC challenged Lundbeck’s acquisition of the rights to NeoPro-
fen and lost. The courts concluded that though Indocin and NeoProfen
are meant to treat the same disease, they are not in the same “market”
because “treatment decisions are based solely on perceived clinical
advantages/disadvantages of” each drug rather than on any price dif-
ferences between the two.13 Although the courts agreed that either drug
could be used to treat PDA, they concluded that in reality, neonatologists
choose a specific drug based on their own clinical experience.14 In other
words, the individuals choosing the drug are basically price insensi-
tive,15 thus undermining FTC’s claim that it was Lundbeck’s co-owner-
ship of both FDA-approved drugs allowed it to drastically raise prices.
The neonatologists’ insensitivity to price changes is actually not
that surprising. Studies consistently show that doctors generally do
not know the cost of drugs or procedures that they themselves pre-
scribe.16 Patients are equally price insensitive because for a vast major-
ity of them, insurance covers medical costs (often after some sort of
co-pay that doesn’t significantly vary with the treatment).17 All of this
may present a potentially intractable problem when it comes to con-
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11 FTC v. Lundbeck, 650 F.3d 1236, 1238 (8th Cir. 2011).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1240.
14 Ovation, 2010 WL 3810015, at *17–18.
15 See Lundbeck, 650 F.3d at 1241.
16 See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Con-
sumers Direct Health Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 29 (2009); Steve D. Shad-
owen, Keith B. Leffler, & Joseph T. Lukens, Anticompetitive Product Changes in
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 11 n.33 (2009).
17 Christopher Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin
Back in the Health Care Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 939 (2013).
trolling the spiraling costs of medical care,18 but it does shed light on
what constitutes a “market” for a particular pharmaceutical com-
pound. It is to that question that I now turn.
III. DEFINING THEMARKET IN PHARMACEUTICAL CASES
It is a truism that in any merger case defining the relevant market is
the first and, perhaps, the most important step.19 It is here that the
FTC’s lack of depth in medical and pharmacological sciences caused its
antitrust analysis to falter. The problem with FTC’s approach is that it
ignores or at least heavily discounts three fundamental institutional
realities of pharmacological markets. The courts in Lundbeck picked up
on that failure, but they too did not address the full scope of issues that
should be considered when defining pharmaceutical markets. Instead
of looking at the prescribing physicians’ behavior alone, the Commis-
sion and the courts should consider three separate, but interrelated
issues before determining the boundaries of the relevant market.
First, in determining the market for a given drug it is important to
understand the FDA approval process. In order for any drug to be
legally sold in the United States (whether by prescription or over-the-
counter) it must undergo rigorous testing and, ultimately, approval by
the FDA.20 Prior to granting such approval, the FDAmust be satisfied
that the drug is both safe and efficacious for the condition meant to be
treated.21 After satisfying itself that the drug is safe and effective, the
FDA grants approval for the chemical compound to enter the mar-
ket.22 The FDA also approves a label for the new drug.23 In other
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18 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE
SPENDING 6 (2007).
19 See, e.g. Funeral Consumers Alliance, Inc. v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 695 F.3d
330, 348 (5th Cir. 2012); City of New York v. Group Health Inc., 649 F.3d 151,
155 (2d Cir. 2011).
20 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2014).
21 Id. § 355(a), (b), (j).
22 Id. § 355(c)(1)(A).
23 Id. § 355(a), (c), (d). SeeMartin A. Ramey, Conte v. Wyeth: Caveat Innova-
tor and the Case for Perpetual Liability in Drug Labeling, 4 PITT. J. ENVTL PUB. HEALTH
L. 73, at n.127 (2010) (That label “includes drug indications, contraindications,
instructions for use, warnings and similar information.”); and Labeling Require-
ments for Prescription Drugs and/or Insulin, 21 C.F.R. § 201.56–.57 (2005).
words, technically speaking, the FDA approves the compound and
the specific uses of that compound, which are then described on the
compound’s label.24 The drug manufacturer is always responsible for
updating the label with any additional warnings or potential side
effects,25 but it is not required, and, in fact, not permitted to add any
additional indications for use absent a separate FDA approval.26 Nor
is the manufacturer permitted to advertise that his drug can be used
to treat an “off-label” condition.27
These prohibitions on label alterations and off-label advertising,
however, do not translate to prohibition on off-label use.28 Indeed,
once the chemical compound itself is approved for sale, a prescribing
physician can prescribe the medication for whatever condition or ail-
ment he deems appropriate.29 In fact, off-label use is prevalent in
almost all areas of medical practice.30 Sometimes the off-label use is
similar to the FDA-approved use, as is the case with Actiq (oral trans-
mucosal fentanyl citrate), which is approved for breakthrough pain in
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24 See Jacqueline Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost: Medicare Decisions,
Transparency and Public Trust, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 17 (2010).
25 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i).
26 See 21 U.S.C. § 551(b)(1)(A); Applications for FDAApproval to Market
a New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(a) (2014).
27 Prescription Drug Advertising, 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4) (2013). Firms,
however, often violate these prohibitions. See Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out
Institutional Corruption to Manage Inappropriate Off-Label Drug Use, 41 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 654, 657 (2013).
28 Michael Friedman, Deputy Comm’r for Operations, FDA, Prepared
Statement Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmen-
tal Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
(Sept. 12, 1996), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960912a.html.
29 SeeArtie Berns, Dementia and Antipsychotics: A Prescription for Problems,
33 J. LEGAL MED. 553, 562 (2012); Michelle L. Mello, Psychotropic Medication and
Foster Care Children: A Prescription for State Oversight, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 395,
407–08 (2012).
30 Ryan Abbott, Big Data and Pharmacovigilance: Using Health Information
Exchanges to Revolutionize Drug Safety, 99 IOWA L. REV. 225, 264 (2013)
(“[O]ff-label use is common and legal; it accounts for around one-fifth of all
prescriptions.”).
cancer patients, but is often used to treat moderate-to-severe chronic,
nonmalignant pain.31 Other times though, the prescribed use differs
radically from the FDA-approved indication. For example, Zoloft (ser-
traline) is often used to treat premature ejaculation while being
approved only as an anti-depressant.32
One might wonder why the drug companies would not move to
expand their labels to include new indications; after all, the more indi-
cations a drug could be marketed for, the higher the likely profit for
the company. In reality, however, the calculation is not that simple. The
FDA approval process for a new use is both costly and time consum-
ing. The cost of submitting a “supplemental” application is in the mil-
lions of dollars,33 while the approval time may actually exceed the time
spent approving the initial application.34 What’s more, the new studies
may bring previously unknown problems to the fore35—a useful out-
come for the patients, but a risky one for the pharmaceutical company.
Finally, while the company is conducting these additional studies and
the FDA is conducting its review, the clock continues ticking on any
patent-based exclusive rights that the company may have in the
underlying chemical compound.36 Thus, by the time the company
receives the FDA approval to list an additional indication on the label,
the patent rights may have expired or be close to expiration, thus
allowing a generic company to enter the market and reap the benefits
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31 See John Carreyrou, Potent Product: Narcotic “Lollipop” Becomes Big
Seller Despite FDA Curbs—Actiq Is Only for Cancer Pain But Cephalon Pitches It
to Many Types of Doctors—“Like the Most Delicious Candy,” WALL ST. J., Nov. 3,
2006, at A1.
32 See Chris Adams, Off-label Drug Use Concern, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
May 9, 2005, at A5.
33 See Leah Brannon, Regulating Drug Promotion on the Internet, 54 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 599, 618 n.151 (1999) (noting that a supplemental application for a
new use could cost over $300 million (in 1997 dollars)).
34 See Mitchell Oates, Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment through Pro-
duction and Disclosure of Research into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals, 80
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1272, 1285 n.66 (2005).
35 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 377 (2007).
36 See Oates, supra note 34, at 1285.
of these additional studies.37 Although the generic’s label won’t be able
to list the new indication due to the FDA-based three-year exclusivity
provision and any additional patents claiming the use of the drug
rather than the chemical composition,38 once a physician prescribes a
brand-name drug, for whatever indication, a pharmacist is generally
free to fill the prescription with a generic substitute.39
The bottom line is that drugs that are FDA-approved to treat a
medical condition may not be the only drugs actually used to treat
that condition. This means that in defining the relevant market, it is
erroneous to look only at what FDA has approved. Instead, the mar-
ket consists of both on-label and off-label medications. Such a mar-
ket definition would reflect the reality of medicinal practice in this
country. Had the FTC looked beyond merely FDA-approved med-
ications to treat PDA, it would have recognized that clinical studies
showed that a simple (and rather inexpensive) oral suspension of
ibuprofen (rather than intravenously administered Indocin or Neo-
Profen) can be used to treat the condition.40 Ibuprofen, of course, has
long been available in generic form and could have been used as a
substitute for the other two drugs. It is an open question whether
oral suspension of ibuprofen is actually used by neonatologists to
treat PDA. If neonatologists eschew this option, then perhaps in
Lundbeck there were no competing off-label drugs in the relevant
market.41 In either case, the fundamental point remains—in deter-
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37 Id.
38 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(D)(iv) (2014).
39 Indeed, the law may require pharmacists to fill a prescription with a
generic substitute, unless explicitly directed otherwise by the physician. See
generally Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settle-
ments: The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1017
(2010).
40 See Heyman, supra note 6, and accompanying text.
41 Despite the fact that some studies reported the efficacy of oral suspen-
sion for the closure of PDA as early as 2002, see Supapannachart, supra note 6,
this choice remains unpopular in the United States. There may be several
explanations for this. Doctors may simply be more comfortable with the
drugs they know, and given the potential for things to go wrong should the
PDA not close, may be unwilling to switch (as they did in fact testify at trial).
mining the scope of the relevant market for treating a medical con-
dition it is important to consider not just therapies specifically
approved for the treatment of that condition but also other therapies
that are actually being used in the field despite the absence of a label
recommending such use.
The second error that the FTC made in defining the market in
Lundbeck was focusing almost exclusively on the condition to be
treated. Although looking at the ailment is a reasonable point of
departure when attempting to define a market, it is important to rec-
ognize that different drugs with different mechanisms of actions can
be used to treat the same overriding condition. For example, in treat-
ing hypertension a physician can choose among: diuretics, beta-block-
ers, ACE inhibitors, calcium channel blockers, angiotensin II receptor
blockers, and a number of others.42 There are multitudes of drugs
within each category.43 When prescribing a drug to treat hypertension,
a physician doesn’t consider only the patient’s blood pressure, but
also drug interactions, potential side effects, age, comorbidities, and
even race.44 Thus, for some group of patients a beta-blocker would be
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FTC v. Lundbeck, 650 F.3d 1236, 1241 (8th Cir. 2011). Additionally, the early
reports were small group studies, which may not be viewed as sufficiently
robust to justify switching from a proven therapy. Finally, all of the early
reports are from studies conducted abroad (for example, in Iran, Israel, and
Thailand) and thus may be viewed somewhat skeptically by American
physicians. None of this is to say that the studies are incorrect or that oral
ibuprofen is in reality less effective than intravenous ibuprofen or
indomethacin. Rather, this is to explain why Lundbeck thought that its pric-
ing strategy would work (and did indeed work). See infra note 61 and accom-
panying text.
42 See, e.g., John D. Bisognano, et al., Calcium Channel Blockers,
Angiotensin Receptor Blockers, and Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme Inhibitors:
Effectiveness in Combination with Diuretics or -blockers for Treating Hypertension,
3 VASCULAR HEALTH RISK MGMT. 579 (2007).
43 See AM. HEART ASS’N, Types of Blood Pressure Medications, available at
http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Conditions/HighBloodPressure/Pre-
ventionTreatmentofHighBloodPressure/Types-of-Blood-Pressure-Medica-
tions_UCM_303247_Article.jsp (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
44 See John A. Rizzo, Advertising and Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceu-
tical Industry: The Case of Antihypertensive Drugs, 42 J.L. & ECON. 89, 94 (1999).
preferred while for others it would be a diuretic.45 The two categories
of drugs, though both capable of and used for treating hypertension,
are not in the same market because in fact they are not used on the
same population. If one were to focus simply on the ailment being
treated—hypertension—one would miss this important patient-con-
sumer differentiation.
This is what the courts in Lundbeck recognized when they held
that NeoProfen and Indocin were not in the same market because the
choice of drugs depended not on price but on physicians’ evaluation
of the risk of side effects and general comfort with the drug.46 Admit-
tedly, in Lundbeck, this conclusion did not rest on particularly strong
grounds, as it seems that the two drugs have the same mode of action
and similar side effects (with NeoProfen being somewhat less likely to
cause these effects).47 However, the court was correct in recognizing
that it is not sufficient merely to identify the condition which the
pharmaceutical compound is intended to treat; rather, one must look
deeper and consider any comorbidities and the side effects of the
drug that may differentially affect different patient subpopulations.48
In other words, I think that the Lundbeck court relied too much on mere
preferences by neonatologists, but was ultimately focused on the right
issue because those preferences are most often driven by biologic and
pharmacologic considerations. These considerations must always be
taken into account when attempting to define a proper market for
drugs and medical devices.
Finally, in defining the market, it is important to consider the pres-
ence or absence of exclusivity regimes that the drug may enjoy. In the
pharmaceutical world, the exclusivity regimes come in two varieties:
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45 See JOINT NAT’L COMM. ON DETECTION, EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF
HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE, The 1984 Report of the Joint National Committee on
Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure, 144 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1045, 1057 (1985) (noting that ACE inhibitors are less effective
in African-Americans than in whites).
46 Lundbeck, 650 F.3d at 1240.
47 See,e.g., Grace Poon, Ibuprofen Lysine (NeoProfen) for the Treatment of
Patent Ductus Arteriosus, 20 BAYLOR UNIV. MED. CTR. PROCEEDINGS 83 (2007).
48 See Lundbeck, 650 F.3d at 1240.
patent-based and FDA-based.49 When there is a valid, unexpired patent
on the underlying chemical compound or on all of those uses of the
compound approved by the FDA, a generic company is unable to enter
the market and compete with the brand-name product.50 However,
once the patents expire, even if new patents are issued on additional
uses, a generic company can enter the market with its own version of
the drug51 (though it will not be permitted to market that version for
purposes that are still under patent.)52 A generic company can enter the
market at much lower costs and within a much shorter period than a
pioneer company, because a generic company needs merely to show
that its product is bioequivalent to the already approved brand name.53
Moreover, a generic need not wait until the brand name’s patents actu-
ally expire to submit its application to the FDA. It can file long before
the expiration date and simply request that the approval go into effect
immediately following the patent expiration date.54
The FDA-based regime is somewhat different, but its basic features
track the patent regime. Again, once the FDA-based exclusivity on the
chemical compound expires, a generic drug manufacturer can seek
approval to enter the market even if there are additional FDA-based
exclusivities on use of the brand-name drug.55 As with the patent regime,
the generic would not be permitted to list on its label the indications for
which FDA-based exclusivity has not yet expired.56 However, as previ-
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49 See generally, Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New
Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 1448–54
(2013).
50 See Laura J. Grebe, Generic Entry in a Rough Economy—Proposed Legisla-
tion May Ease Health Care Costs, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 167, 187 (2010).
51 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (2014); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v.
Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1672 (2012).
52 See Caraco Pharm., 132 S. Ct. at 1672; 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2014).
53 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv).
54 Id. §3 55(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).
55 See Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Wax-
man Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 592–93 (2003).
56 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii).
ously discussed, the lack of the specific indication on the generic’s label is
not a bar to substituting the generic for the prescribed brand name.57
The lack of any exclusivity barriers to market entry and the com-
paratively low cost of such entry should be considered in defining the
market for pharmaceuticals, because the presence of these conditions
exerts a strong check on the ability of the brand-name manufacturer
to raise prices.
By the time the FTC lodged its complaint in Lundbeck, patents on
Indocin had long expired.58 Thus, in theory, it should have been easy
and advantageous for generics to seek approval to produce a generic
version of the drug. The FTC recognized in its complaint that no
patents bar the entry of generics,59 but argued that entry barriers are
high because it takes time to win approval and that given the small
population suffering from PDA the payoff for such generic companies
may be rather small.60 What the FTC was missing, however, is that the
payoff was small precisely because the brand-name Indocin was
underpriced, making the drug an unattractive investment for a
generic firm. Indeed, Lundbeck’s entire strategy was premised on
raising the price of Indocin so as to attract more generic companies,
increase competition for that drug, and then position itself as a sole
provider of what it viewed as a better alternative—NeoProfen.61
Whether the FTC was right or wrong on the barrier issue in
Indocin, its recognition that the presence or absence of a patent on a
drug is a key consideration in defining the market for that drug was
correct and should continue to be applied in future cases.
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57 See supra note 39 and the accompanying text. The Federal Circuit has
held that a generic company does not infringe use patents merely because its
drug is likely to be prescribed for patented uses, so long as at least one
approved use is off-patent. SeeWarner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F. 3d
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
58 See Complaint, supra note 2, at 5.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 7.
61 See FTC v. Ovation Pharm., No. 08-6379, 2010 WL 3810015, at * 6–7 (D.
Minn. Aug. 31, 2010).
IV. CONCLUSION
In deciding whether to challenge the sale or transfer of patents or
wholesale merger of pharmaceutical companies, the FTC should
apply traditional antitrust law and economic principles. But the Com-
mission should apply those principles to the realities of medical prac-
tice. In doing so the Commission ought to recognize that certain
pharmaceuticals or medical devices can be substitutes product even if
not formally approved by the FDA for that specific purpose. Addi-
tionally, in defining the market the Commission must realize that
although those multiple drugs could treat the same major medical
condition, the drugs are not necessarily competitors with each other if
physicians select drugs (and prefer one to another) based on consider-
ations besides the underlying medical condition. Finally, the FTC
should remember that with the expiration of patents for the active
ingredient and at least one FDA-approved indication, any number of
generics can and will enter the market if the drug itself is profitable.
Only once such factors are taken into account should the FTC exercise
its powers. It is precisely because the Commission failed to do so that
it lost in Lundbeck, and rightly so.
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